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Abstract 
This paper reviews the empirical research that has been generated by Oswald’s thesis, which 
claims that there is a causal relationship from homeownership to unemployment. The literature 
confirms a decreasing effect of homeownership on geographical mobility of workers, but does 
not in general confirm that homeowners have longer unemployment spells or higher 
unemployment rates. Even though this finding is related to heterogeneity in the labour force and 
associated selectivity effects, there are clear indications that there is also an effect of 
homeownership on the search for jobs on the local labour market, especially for highly leveraged 
homeowners. To offer an integrated representation of the various forces at work, this paper 
proposes an umbrella model with endogenous search intensity that is consistent with much of the 
empirical evidence. In particular, it predicts lower geographical mobility of homeowners as well 
as higher exit rates from unemployment by acceptance of jobs on the local labour market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 An important branch of urban economics is formed by residential location theory. This 
framework is usually based on utility maximizing households who are seeking for a spatial 
location (including a dwelling, land and site-specific characteristics). The residential location 
choice implies also decisions on the journey from home to work (commuting). In a standard 
residential location model the attributes of the location enter as arguments in the utility model, 
while the dwelling prices (including land prices) and commuting costs are included in the budget 
constraint. In an urban land use and location equilibrium model, the locational choice and the 
housing and land prices are determined simultaneously.  
 The cornerstone of urban residential choice models can be found in the standard 
frameworks designed by Alonso, Mills, Muth and Henderson, where bid rents play a central role 
in urban development. Later on, this standard model was extended by incorporating also 
neighbourhood characteristics (such as congestion, air pollution, racial composition or social 
fragmentation). Such spatial externalities (positive and negative) play increasingly an important 
role in modern urban economics.  
 Clearly, housing has a varied set of specific and generic features: shelter, indivisible 
capital investment, consumption good, durability etc. The housing market is thus a complex and 
heterogeneous market which is hard to model in an applied context, especially when it concerns 
imperfectly competitive markets. In modern empirical research, micro-based approaches based 
on search theory play a central role (e.g., discrete choice models, conjoint choice models). 
 An important question in regard to the housing market is the issue of property rights of the 
housing asset. In the standard urban economic framework, the assumption is made that it does not 
matter whether a household owns or rents a house, as it is in principle possible to purchase a 
portfolio of dwelling assets that is equal under both modes of tenure (ownership or rent). The 
tenure choice however, may make a difference, if the maintenance of the housing asset is taken 
into consideration (Henderson and Ioannides, 1983).  It seems plausible that a renter – compared 
to an owner – will care less about his dwelling than is efficient, as the value rise from a better 
maintenance accrues to the landlord. Furthermore, in an uncertain housing market but with long-
 2 
term steady financial prospects, private property of a house may create additional security and 
wealth to the owner.  
 It should be noted that the choice of housing may have serious implications for the costs 
of commuting. Thus, the expected wealth of housing ownership has to be corrected for the costs 
of journey from home to work. This means that there is an interaction between the choices on the 
labour market and the housing market. These choices do not only relate to the spatial choice of 
the location where to work and where to live, but may also have implications for the choice of 
ownership and rent of a dwelling. This is particularly relevant, if the possession of an own house 
limits a flexible adjustment on the labour market. This will be further discussed in the next 
section. 
It should be noted that the above earlier urban economics contributions on urban shape, 
density and rent gradients are based on simplified monocentric city configurations, with often 
undifferentiated housing markets without residential submarkets, with static income distributions 
without socio-economic urban dynamics, and with absence of spatial externalities without 
(positive and negative) neighbourhood effects on residential property values or geographic 
mobility. These stringent assumptions have in recent years been seriously criticized, on both 
conceptual and empirical grounds (see e.g. Adair et al., 1996; Bourassa et al., 1999; Goodman 
and Thibodeau, 1998; Jud and Winkler, 2002; Parkes et al., 2002; Song and Knaap, 2003, 2004; 
Watkins, 2001). The complexity of urban housing markets is indeed great and calls for careful 
modelling experiments, with both a solid theoretical foundation and a promising scope for 
applied analysis. The valuation of urban residential properties is fraught with many difficulties 
(ranging from revealed preference market-based valuation approaches to stated preference 
survey-based approaches such as contingent valuation methods and conjoint analyses). The 
incorporation of spatial externalities, labour market choices and uncertainties (including 
commuting and transaction costs) and two-earner households will add to the complexity of urban 
housing models (see e.g., Follain and Jimenez 1985; Free and Jud, 2003; Kauko, 2003; Meens, 
2001; Sultana, 2006; Wilhelmsson, 2002).  
The spatial separation of housing markets and labour markets has prompted the 
phenomenon of commuting as a necessary consequence to bridge the gap between home and 
work. Commuting is often seen as a passive response to either a residential location decisions or a 
work decision, but ought to be considered in a broader choice context of socio-economic spatial 
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decision-making of households. Commuting may incur time and transport costs, but in a utility-
maximising framework we know that commuting may be rational if the marginal benefits still 
exceed the marginal costs. Such marginal costs may – from a societal perspective – even include 
environmental externalities. The modern literature on commuting (in terms of trip volumes, 
environmental stress or ‘wasteful commuting’) is vast (see for a review van Ommeren, 2004). 
Modern commuting analysis is often cast in the framework or search theory on the labour market 
(see e.g., Rouwendal, 1998).  
 Less attention in the literature has been given to the implications of tenure conditions in 
urban housing markets for job mobility and commuting patterns. This issue has been addressed in 
some papers by Oswald (1996, 1997), who has argued that home ownership causes more inertia 
in spatial mobility than home rents due to the relatively higher transaction and moving costs. 
Consequently, home owners tend to have more stable search behaviour on the labour market than 
renters do. ‘Their home is their castle’ and forms the spatial orientation point for job search and 
commuting. Their limited action radius of search makes them more vulnerable, so that the 
average unemployment of home owners in the long run may be higher than that of renters. If 
home owners become unemployed and decide to stay in their residential location, then one may 
also expect their average duration of unemployment to be longer. 
Oswald’s (1996, 1999) thesis claims thus essentially that there is a causal relationship 
between dwelling tenure choice and unemployment. He finds that if the rate of homeownership is 
10 percentage points higher, unemployment increases with 2%. If true, the increase in 
homeownership in many European countries in the second half of the twentieth century would be 
an important cause of the increase in structural unemployment. Oswald suggests that the higher 
transaction costs associated with moving house are the reason why exit rates from unemployment 
are much lower among owner-occupiers than among renters, or at least of renters in the private 
(unregulated) part of the housing market. 
Oswald’s thesis is at first glance paradoxical in that it seems to contradict much of the 
common sense about homeowners. In most, if not all countries, homeownership increases with 
income and workers with high incomes have in general more human capital and a lower risk of 
becoming unemployed. Moreover, credit constraints make it difficult for those without a tenured 
position and a non-negligible amount of wealth to borrow the money needed to purchase a decent 
house. Unemployed persons are unlikely to meet this requirement. However, this leaves open the 
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possibility that the probability of finding a new job can be substantially lower for homeowners 
than for renters who become unemployed, and that there are substantial lock-in effects associated 
with homeownership. Indeed, the hypothesis that the higher costs of moving for homeowners 
hamper residential mobility for job reasons seems a priori quite plausible. The thesis therefore 
directed attention towards a neglected and potentially important effect of increase in 
homeownership that makes it worthwhile to be tested empirically. 
Oswald’s approach is based on rather strict assumptions. The empirical basis for the inert 
behaviour of home owners is feeble. What would, for instance, happen if there is a very high 
tension (i.e., shortage) in various segments of the rental housing market (like in the Netherlands)? 
In addition, there is most likely not an identical income distribution for home owners and renters, 
so that their prospects on the labour market (and their willingness to commute or to change their 
commuting behaviour) may be different. These issues call for further empirical testing; in 
particular, of the question whether there is a positive elasticity of home ownership with respect to 
unemployment. The macro-economic evidence of this relationship appears to be rather weak 
between different countries or regions. Several authors have therefore, adopted a micro-economic 
(individual or panel) data approach to identify a statistical relationship between unemployed 
people and the probability to move (see e.g., Henley, 1998; van der Vlist, 2001). In general, the 
results are not conclusive for the Oswald hypothesis. For example, Goss and Phillips (1997) 
using panel data from the USA for examining potential labour market influences (i.e., length of 
unemployment) of home ownership conclude that for several categories of unemployed home 
ownership significantly reduces unemployment duration, mainly because mortgage payments 
prompt active job search and home equity aids job search through a wealth effect. This negative 
result on the Oswald hypothesis was further confirmed by a more recent study of Coulson and 
Fisher (2006) who found – using US panel data – that there is no statistical support for the 
Oswald hypothesis. Instead, their model showed that home owners always have better labour 
market outcomes than renters. These intriguing and sometimes confusing results call for a more 
thorough analysis of the processes at work on housing, labour and commuting markets. So there 
is a need to carefully examine the Oswald assumptions from both a theoretical and empirical 
perspective.  
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In the present paper we review some empirical work that has been carried out in reaction 
to Oswald’s publication at both the macro and micro scale, and subsequently propose a search 
model that summarizes most of the evidence. While the reluctance of homeowners to accept job 
offers outside the local labour market and the associated lower residential mobility of 
homeowners are important features of our model, it does not predict that their unemployment 
rates are higher and is in fact consistent with the possibility that homeowners have lower 
unemployment rates than renters. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review empirical studies that 
investigate the validity of Oswald’s thesis and some related issues at both the macro and micro 
scale.  In section 3 we propose a search model that is consistent with much of the available 
evidence. The model considers optimal search behaviour in a context where the searcher can 
influence the arrival rate of job offers by changing the intensity of search. Search can be directed 
at the local or the national labour market. Section 4 offers concluding and prospective research 
remarks. 
 
2. Evidence on the Housing Tenure – Unemployment Relationship 
 
2.1 Unemployment and home ownership at the macro level 
Oswald’s (1996) paper quickly triggered additional research. For instance, Pehkonen (1997) 
confirmed the relation between homeownership and unemployment for aggregate data referring 
to Finnish regions, and Partridge and Rickman (1997) confirmed the relationship for similar data 
referring to US states. More importantly, in their contribution to the Handbook of Labour 
Economics, Nickel and Layard (1999) considered the correlation between unemployment and the 
share of homeownership for OECD countries.1 Controlling for other variables, they find a 
significant coefficient for the share of homeownership in regressions of total unemployment rate 
and short-term unemployment, but not on long-term unemployment. They also find a significant 
coefficient for the share of homeownership on the employment to population ratio of the whole 
working age population and working age males, but not on working age women. The authors 
express some doubt whether these relationships are due to the mobility barrier effect proposed by 
                                                 
1
 See also Nickell (1997, 1998). 
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Oswald, since they find no correlation between the share of homeownership and regional 
mobility in OECD countries. 
Later macro studies are less favourable to Oswald’s thesis. Green and Hendershott (2001) 
reconsidered Oswald’s evidence for the US. They confirmed Oswald’s finding that changes in 
unemployment rates were related to changes in the share of homeownership, but note that the 
relationship disappears when the observations are weighted by the household population of the 
state to which they refer. They are also unable to find a significant coefficient for homeownership 
if they use unemployment shares among household heads as the dependent variable. Running 
similar regressions for various age groups suggests that the relationship proposed by Oswald 
holds for middle aged households (heads between 35 and 64 years of age) when they consider the 
total labour force in the relevant age class. When attention is focused on unemployment among 
household heads, the estimated coefficients for the change in the share of homeownership for 
middle aged households are at the boundary of statistical significance. Green and Hendershott 
interpret this as evidence that homeownership restricts especially the mobility of secondary 
workers in the households (that is, partners of the head). They argue that household heads have 
no other choice than to move to a better region when the local labour market situation 
deteriorates. When only their partners become unemployed, staying in the region and hoping for 
better times may be preferred. However, testing this hypothesis was outside the scope of their 
paper. 
Barrios García and Rodríguez Hernández (2004) take a closer look at Spain, a country 
where the rates of unemployment and homeownership are both high. They develop a two 
equation model for homeownership and unemployment and estimate it for Spanish regions. Their 
conclusion is almost exactly the opposite of Oswald’s findings: ‘Spanish  provinces with 
ownership rates that are 10 percentage points higher have an unemployment rate that is roughly 
2.2 percentage points lower.’2  So, the macro-economic facts for Spain are not in favour of the 
Oswald hypothesis.  
 
2.2 Unemployment and homeownership at the micro level 
Studies using micro-data demonstrate that unemployed persons are more reluctant to accept jobs 
at a greater distance from their current locations (see, for instance, Van den Berg and Gorter, 
                                                 
2
 Barrios Garcia end Rodriguez Hernandez (2004), p. 573. 
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1996) and that this is in particular the case when they are owner-occupiers (see Van den Berg and 
Van Vuuren, 1998). Even though this provides strong a priori endorsement of Oswald’s thesis, 
conclusions should not be drawn too fast. One of the first studies that examined the Oswald thesis 
on micro data was carried out by Goss and Phillips (1997), who found that the duration of 
unemployment was shorter for owner-occupiers, especially when a mortgage loan was present. 
They suggest that homeowners with weak equity positions have lower reservation wages than 
renters or outright owners with comparable labour market characteristics. Alternatively, the 
search intensity of such homeowners may be higher. In both cases the proper interpretation is 
probably that unemployment is more inconvenient for homeowners with (large) mortgage 
payments, and provides a strong incentive to search for another job. Since other evidence (see, 
for instance, Henley, 1998) confirms that homeowners with weak equity positions have 
substantially lower mobility on the housing market, it appears that they manage to realize their 
shorter unemployment spells without accepting jobs outside their local labour market. 
 Flatau et al. (2003) considered the role of leverage in the duration of unemployment of 
homeowners in greater detail. Using Australian data they conclude that outright owners have 
lower exit rates from unemployment than private renters, as hypothesized by Oswald, especially 
when they are female. However, the larger group of leveraged homeowners has significantly 
shorter unemployed durations than private renters, which contradicts Oswald’s thesis. The 
authors interpret this as a result of the pressure on unemployed homeowners to meet the mortgage 
payment requirements. High mortgage payments thus have a similar effect as low replacement 
ratios. The rather striking implication of the analysis of Flatau et al. (2003) is that workers who 
are least mobile on the housing market (cf. Henley, 1998) have the shortest unemployment 
durations, which is an exact reversal of Oswald’s thesis. 
Using Danish micro data, Munch et al. (2005) confirm that homeownership hampers the 
propensity to move residence for job reasons. They have the possibility to distinguish moves on 
the local labour market (requiring no change in residence) from those outside the local labour 
market (requiring a change in the residential location). Homeowners are less likely to accept a job 
outside the local labour market than renters. However, homeowners have better chances of 
finding a job on the local labour market when becoming unemployed. This counteracts the 
negative effect of immobility on the housing market and the net result of the two effects is a 
negative correlation between home-ownership and unemployment duration. Again, the 
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implication is that the group with the lowest residential mobility has the shortest unemployment 
duration. 
The authors of the studies just mentioned have attempted to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity among workers that causes correlation between homeownership and the chance to 
find a new job when becoming unemployed. For instance, it is plausible that workers who have a 
good labour market position for reasons that cannot be observed by the researcher are more 
inclined to buy a house, knowing that they have better chances than others to find employment in 
the local labour market in the unfortunate case of becoming unemployed. The empirical studies 
discussed above find that a strong effect of homeownership on unemployment duration remains 
after controlling for these effects, and therefore strongly suggest that the search efforts of the 
unemployed homeowners are the major determinant of their lower unemployment rate.3 These 
search efforts can be a willingness to accept jobs in the local labour market at lower wages, as is 
suggested in the job search model used by Munch et al. (2005) to motivate their empirical 
specification, but also higher search intensity. The model we propose below considers the latter 
possibility. 
 
2.3 Other studies 
A few papers have addressed some other aspects of the relation between homeownership and 
labour market behaviour at the level of individual workers. A small number of other studies have 
considered aspects of Oswald’s thesis in the context of a regional or multiregional labour market 
model. In this subsection we briefly discuss these two branches of the literature. 
Even though Oswald (1996, 1999) stressed the negative effects of homeownership on 
mobility and, through this channel, on unemployment, he made clear that the proposed solution 
would be to increase the private rental sector. Indeed, economists have almost unanimously 
rejected rent control4 because of its negative efficiency effects. In the context of the Oswald 
thesis, Svarer et al. (2005) find indeed that renters who experience relatively large benefits from 
rent control are less likely to accept a job from outside the local labour market than others. 
However, they also find that such renters are more likely to accept jobs in the local labour market 
                                                 
3
 A working paper by Brunet and Lesueur (2003) confirms this. She estimates a duration model and finds that 
homeowners have lower exit rates from unemployment when controls for search intensity are included. The 
coefficients for the indicators of search intensity are highly significant. 
4
 See Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) for a recent study stressing the negative effects, and Arnott (1995) for a notable 
exception. 
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and their estimated models suggest that the net effect of rent control on the hazard of leaving 
unemployment may be positive.5 The results are therefore similar to those of Munch et al. (2005) 
for the net effect of homeownership on unemployment: the renters who are less mobile on the 
housing market may have the shortest unemployment durations. 
 Munch et al. (2006) have also investigated the possible influence of homeownership on 
job duration.  The empirical results for Danish workers confirm their hypotheses that 
homeowners have lower transition rates into non-local jobs, earn higher wages and are also less 
likely to move to other local jobs than renters. These results differ from those of Van 
Leuvensteijn en Koning (2004) who find that Dutch homeowners have shorter job durations than 
renters. 
Dohmen (2005) attempts to reconcile some of the macro evidence supporting Oswald’s 
thesis with the micro evidence that unemployment rates among homeowners are lower than 
among renters. He distinguishes high skilled and low skilled workers, and assumes that – all else 
equal - the former are more mobile than the latter. For both groups, homeownership decreases 
mobility. If the relative size of the private rental sector shrinks, the more mobile renters (i.e. the 
high skilled ones, who have higher incomes) are the first to switch to owner occupation, which 
results in lower mobility among owners as well as renters. Since mobility is negatively related to 
unemployment, this leads to the conclusion that a decrease in the amount of private rental 
housing leads increases the overall unemployment rate. Coulson and Fisher (2002) attempt to 
verify the predictions of this theoretical model. 
Haavio and Kauppi (2003) develop a multiregional model and show that owner 
occupation results in efficiency losses if positive shocks in labour demand vary over space, 
whereas rental markets always reach locational efficiency. The paper does not contain empirical 
work. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The micro studies discussed in subsection 2.2 almost unanimously reject the Oswald thesis. Even 
though the idea that homeownership decreases mobility on the housing market is confirmed by 
all studies, the - at first sight very plausible - corollary that this has negative implications for 
unemployment duration could only be confirmed for specific subgroups of homeowners. 
                                                 
5
 Svarer et al. (2005, p. 2177). 
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Notwithstanding their lower mobility on the housing market, most homeowners have better 
chances to escape from a situation of unemployment than renters have. The probable explanation 
is that many homeowners have a strong incentive to leave unemployment because of a larger 
utility loss, or that they have a better labour market position. Since papers that attempt to control 
for the latter effect still find higher exit rates from unemployment for homeowners, the incentive 
effect is probably substantial. This suggests that homeownership reduces unemployment, rather 
than increasing it as was hypothesized by Oswald. 
 The evidence at the micro level is – at least as first sight – not consistent with that at the 
macro-level where a number of studies have confirmed the relationship suggested by Oswald. 
One possibility was considered by Dohmen (2005) who showed that a positive relationship 
between homeownership and unemployment at the macro level can be consistent with a labour 
market in which many homeowners are high skilled workers with shorter unemployment 
durations than low skilled workers who are often renters. The relationship at the macro level may 
therefore be quite different from that at the micro level and representative agent interpretations of 
the former may be completely misleading.  
 
3. An Umbrella Search Model for Labour Market and Tenure Choice Interactions 
 
The empirical research discussed in the previous section is puzzling. On the one hand it 
seems to confirm the basic idea behind Oswald’s thesis, that homeownership hampers residential 
mobility. On the other hand, many results are at variance with the a priori plausible consequence 
that this will have adverse effects on unemployment. This prompts the question whether 
conventional economic reasoning can be consistent with the basic idea as well as with the 
empirical facts.  To shed some light on this question, we present in this section a simple model 
for individual job search on a local or national labour market and consider the consequences of 
owning one’s house. The purpose of the model is to provide us with an integrative analytical tool 
that helps to summarize and interpret the empirical evidence provided by the various studies 
discussed above. 
 
3.1 Development of the model 
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The basic model 
We start with a simple job search model of the type discussed, for instance, in Pissarides (2000). 
Consider an unemployed job searcher who receives acceptable job offers with intensity q . As 
long as he is unemployed, he experiences an instantaneous utility uu. The instantaneous utility 
when employed is uw. An employed worker faces a separation risk σ  and returns to 
unemployment after loosing his job. The Bellman equations associated with this simple model 
are: 
( )VWquV u −+=ρ ,          (1) 
( )WVuW w −+= σρ ,         (2) 
where V denotes the value of unemployment and W that of being employed. Solving for these 
values gives: 
( )
ρσ
ρσ
ρ ++
++
=
q
uuqV uw1          (3) 
and  
ρσ
σρ
ρ ++
++
=
q
uuqW uw)(1 .         (4) 
In this model housing tenure and transaction costs associated with the possible need to 
move to another region after acceptance of a job do not yet play a role. The expected duration of 
unemployment is equal to q1  and the expected duration of employment σ1 . If all the workers 
are identical, the unemployment rate u is equal to: 
.
11
1
q
q
q
unem
+
=
+
=
σ
σ
σ
          (5) 
Below we extend this model with issues that play a significant role in the literature generated by 
Oswald’s thesis. 
 
Search intensity 
The review of the previous section strongly suggests that the generation of job offers differs over 
workers in relation to their housing circumstances. Our aim is to capture these effects into the 
model. To do so, we start with endogenizing the arrival rate of job offers. The model of the 
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previous subsection is intended to provide a stylized description of search behaviour, i.e. of 
activities of the searcher that result in job offers. The search process that leads to the arrival of 
job offers can be made explicit by incorporating the costs of search into the model. We do so in a 
simple way by specifying the instantaneous utility uu  of the unemployed agent as the difference 
between utility experienced when no search is undertaken, denoted as 'uu  and search 
cost ( )'; uuqa . The first Bellman equation, (1), thus becomes: 
( )VWquqauV uu −+−= )';('ρ ,        (6) 
The function a indicates the cost of generating an arrival rate with an intensity q to the searcher. 
In order to reflect the opportunity cost of the resources involved, this cost is made dependent 
on 'uu . For instance, search cost could be specified as the amount of time involved in job search 
times the value of time. The arrival rate generated by the searcher depends on the amount of time 
spent searching and the opportunity cost of time depends on the utility of being unemployed. This 
reasoning suggests a multiplicative specification of search cost: 
( ) )'()(', 21 uu uaqauqa =          (7) 
In what follows, we assume that (7) is valid. In addition, we assume that a1 is a continuous twice 
differentiable function with the following properties:  
0)(1 ≥qa  for al 0≥q ,         (8a) 
01 >
∂
∂
q
a
           (8b) 
02
1
2
>
∂
∂
q
a
.           (8c) 
Assumption (8) states that search cost are never negative, that no offers will be generated unless 
some costly action is undertaken, that the arrival rate of job offers can only be increased if 
additional costly search is undertaken and that the marginal cost of an generating job offers 
increases with the arrival rate, that is, increases in the arrival rate become increasingly difficult to 
realize. It is assumed that a2 is a continuously differentiable non-decreasing function of 'uu .
6
 
                                                 
6
 In later subsections we follow a slightly different specification in which a2 depends on one component of the 
instantaneous utility of being unemployed. 
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The searcher chooses q, while taking into account the associated cost, so as to maximize 
the value of unemployment V, which can be derived on the basis of the Bellman equations (6) 
and (2) as: 
( ) ( )( )
ρσ
ρσ
ρ ++
−++
=
q
qauuq
V uw
'1
        (9) 
The first order condition of this maximization problem can be written as: 
ρσ ++
+−
=
q
qauu
dq
da uw )('
.          (10) 
The left-hand-side of (10) is increasing in q by assumption (8c). Both the numerator and the 
denominator of the right-hand-side are increasing functions of q. It is not difficult to verify that 
the right-hand-side is decreasing in the arrival rate q when it is small, reaches a minimum and 
then becomes increasing. Equation (10) is satisfied at the arrival rate for which the right-hand 
side reaches its minimum. There is a unique arrival rate, q*, for which V is maximized. Figure 1 
illustrates the determination of the optimal arrival rate, as a consequence of the optimal amount 
of search. In the diagram it is assumed that the search cost function is quadratic, and therefore 
that marginal search cost is an increasing linear function of the arrival rate. 
 
 
Marginal search 
cost 
Marginal benefit 
of search 
Marginal 
cost, 
qo Arrival rate of job offers 
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Figure 1 Determination of the optimal arrival rate. 
 
It can be shown that the optimal arrival rate is increasing in the instantaneous utility of 
work uw, decreasing in the instantaneous utility of being unemployed uv, in the separation rate σ, 
and in the rate of discount ρ. The first order condition (10) says that in the optimum the marginal 
cost of search should be equal to the marginal benefits and this facilitates the interpretation of 
these results. If the instantaneous utility of work increases, the marginal benefits from search 
increase. If the instantaneous utility of being unemployed goes up, the attractiveness of ending 
unemployment decreases and search becomes less intense. Also, if the separation rate increases, 
search becomes less rewarding and therefore the optimal search intensity decreases. Finally if the 
rate of discount increases, the future becomes less important and this has a decreasing effect on 
the perceived benefits from search. 
In the previous subsection we showed that the expected duration of unemployment is the 
inverse of the arrival rate of job offers, and with the extension of the model just discussed we can 
say that it is the inverse of the optimal arrival rate as it is determined by the worker. Oswald’s 
thesis can now be interpreted as saying that the optimal search intensity of homeowners is lower 
than that of renters, but since we have not yet introduced housing into the model this issue cannot 
be addressed in the present version of the model. However, the model in its present form suggests 
a number of important potential determinants of difference in unemployment rates among groups 
of workers. In particular, it implies that the gap between the utility of being employed and 
unemployed and the risk of losing one’s job influences the search intensity, and therefore the 
unemployment rates of workers. In the subsections that follow we will see how this can be related 
to homeownership. 
 
Housing 
It is conventional in the job search literature to use the income of a worker for his instantaneous 
(money metric) utility. In order to link the model to the worker’s housing situation, we will use a 
slightly different function that specifies utility as the sum of cash-on-hand and a term referring to 
housing. Cash-on-hand is defined as the difference between income and out-of-pocket housing 
costs. The idea is that utility per period depends on the amount of money that can be spent on 
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(non-durable) consumption goods and on the available stock of durables. For simplicity, the latter 
is represented only by housing, which is certainly the most important durable for most, if not all, 
households. We use an additive formulation, i.e. we specify utility as the sum of cash in hand and 
the utility derived from the stock of durable goods. 
Income is equal to an unemployment benefit b or a wage w. Housing costs are equal to the 
rent r for renters and to out of pocket user costs c (mainly mortgage payments) for owner-
occupiers. Since housing costs are fixed in the short run (that is, they cannot be changed except 
by a costly move to another residence), the difference between income and housing costs indeed 
represents something like cash-on-hand for the worker. The benefits of the house depend on the 
worker’s housing situation. We will scale them to zero for renters and the value for owner 
occupiers will therefore reflect the utility premium associated with owning.7  The difference 
between the housing benefits associated with owning or renting will be denoted as h.8 
We will also assume that the cost of search is dependent on the amount of cash-on-hand 
of the unemployed worker, but not on the component of instantaneous utility that refers to 
durable goods. The reason is that the opportunity costs of search increase with the amount of 
cash-on-hand available to the searcher.9 This means that cash-on-hand, denoted as x, is now the 
argument of the opportunity cost of search a2 , so that we assume: 
( ) 02 >
∂
∂
x
xa
           (11) 
This inequality says that the cost of generating an increase in the arrival rate of job offers is 
increasing in the amount of cash-on-hand. Cash in hand equals b-r for renters and b-c for 
homeowners. 
In the extended model a worker’s utility does not only depend on his employment 
situation, but also on housing tenure. We write: 
);(| rbqarbu ru −−−=          (12a) 
);(| cbqahcbu ou −−+−=          (12b) 
for unemployed renters and owners, respectively. Similarly, we write for owner-occupiers: 
                                                 
7
 It may also be interpreted as reflecting the effect of wealth creation associated with owning through amortization of 
the mortgage and possible increases in house prices. 
8
 Below we discuss how they depend on the worker’s employment situation through tax facilities. 
9
 In search models without housing it is conventional to make search costs depend on the unemployment benefit. See 
e.g. Pissarides (2000, chapter 5). 
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rwu rw −=|            (13a) 
hcwu ow +−=| .          (13b) 
We assume that an increase in the unemployment benefit will always increase the instantaneous 
utility of being unemployed (at given arrival rates of job offers), that is: 
( ) 0;1 >
∂
∂
−
x
xqa
          (14) 
where x denotes cash-on-hand, as before. 
The value of the unemployment V for permanent renters is now: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
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while for owner-occupiers we find: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
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     (16) 
Equations (13) and (14) show that the introduction of housing into the model results in the 
addition of a term reflecting net housing costs into the value of unemployment V. If the arrival 
rate of job offers is independent of housing tenure, the preferred tenure is determined by a 
comparison between the rent r and the difference c-h between out-of-pocket cost and the 
ownership premium. However, we should note that the intensity of search is an endogenous 
variable, and we will return to the housing tenure decision later in this section. 
 Optimal determination of the amount of search will only result in identical arrival rates if 
the amount of cash-on-hand is equal for the two tenure types. When this amount differs, there 
will be more search for the type with the lowest cash-on-hand. If owners have more cash-on-hand 
when unemployed, they will have the lowest amount of search and therefore the highest 
unemployment rate, which would confirm Oswald’s thesis, even though mobility is not yet 
introduced into the model. Note, however, that it is not evident that owner-occupiers have the 
highest amount of cash-on-hand. Young households who just entered homeownership often have 
high monthly mortgage payments and this may well result in relatively low amounts of cash-on-
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hand after becoming unemployed. In the present model, this would result in a higher search 
intensity and a lower unemployment rate compared to renters. Hence, the present model provides 
an explanation for Flatau et al.’s (2003) finding that homeowners with large amounts of mortgage 
debt have low unemployment rates in comparison to renters and outright homeowners. 
 
Moving costs  
In this subsection we extend the model by taking into account that offered jobs could be located 
in the labour market area where the searcher lives, as well as elsewhere in the country. In the 
latter case, acceptance of a job implies that a new residence has to be found elsewhere. This is 
similar to Munch et al. (2005), except for the fact that they consider a model in which arrival 
rates of job offers are fixed. 
We now distinguish jobs from the local labour market, which arrive with intensity lq  and 
jobs from the rest of the country, which arrive with intensity
nq . Both arrival rates are determined 
by the efforts of the searcher. The expected wage after acceptance of a job is still equal to w.  
When the accepted job is located outside the local labour market, the worker has to move to a 
different region and the associated cost is denoted as mc.  
In order to generate job offers, the worker has to search and we assume that search costs 
are determined by both intensities and by the amount of cash-on-hand the searcher has available. 
Generalizing (7), we write: 
)(),(
);,(
21 xaqqa
xqqaa
nl
nl
=
=
          (17) 
where x denotes cash-on-hand. It is now assumed that  
0),(1 ≥nl qqa  for all 0, ≥nl qq , 0)(2 >xa for all 0≥x .     (18a) 
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 These assumptions say that the costs of local and non-local search are both increasing convex 
functions of the arrival rate of job offers. Moreover, additional search on the local market will 
never decrease the marginal cost of search outside the local labour market and vice versa. When 
the arrival rates of job offers from inside and outside the local labour markets are equal, the 
marginal cost of local search is smaller than that of search outside the local labour market. An 
example of a cost function that satisfies (18) is the quadratic specification 
lnln qqqqa 3
2
2
2
1 ααα ++=  with .321 ααα >>  
The Bellman equations for renters are now: 
( ) ( )rrrnrrlnlr mcVWqVWqrbqqarbV −−+−+−−−= ),,(ρ ,    (19) 
( )rrr WVrwW −+−= σρ .         (20) 
Solving these equations for the value of unemployment gives: 
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Maximization with respect to the two arrival rates results in the first order conditions: 
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These first-order conditions are generalizations of (9). Moving costs decrease the marginal 
benefit from search outside the local labour market and increase that of search on the local labour 
market. Equations (22) and (23) imply that in equilibrium the marginal cost of search on the local 
labour is higher than the marginal cost of search outside that market. Assumption (18d) shows 
that this is incompatible with equal arrival rates from the local and other labour markets. Since 
the marginal costs of the two arrival rates are increasing, the arrival rate of local job offers must 
in equilibrium be higher than that of job offers from elsewhere. Note that this is true, even if there 
would be no cost associated with geographical mobility (i.e. 0=rmc ). 
Subtraction of (22) from (23) gives: 
r
nl
mc
q
a
q
a
=
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
,          (24) 
 19 
where we suppressed the arguments of a for notational convenience. This equation says that the 
difference between the marginal costs of increasing the local and the national arrival rate with 
one unit must be equal to the full cost of making a residential move. Since this cost is 
considerable, the equation shows clearly that residential moving costs provide a strong incentive 
to search more intensively on the local labour market than in the rest of the country. 
  The Bellman equations for owner-occupiers are similar to those of the renters and result in 
a value of unemployment: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
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Maximization with respect to the two arrival rates of job offers results in first-order conditions: 
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and instead of (22) we have: 
o
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.          (28) 
Since residential moving costs of homeowners are considerably larger than those of renters, it 
follows that homeowners will direct their search activities even more to the local labour markets 
than renters. This is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Munch et al. (2005). 
Comparative static results are derived in Appendix. A higher wage increases the benefits 
from search and implies more search and therefore higher arrival rates for local as well as other 
jobs. A higher unemployment benefit has a negative effect on the arrival rate of local job offers, 
but the sign of its effect on the arrival rate of other job offers, and on the sum of the two arrival 
rates is not determined. Similarly, a higher rent or higher out-of-pocket housing costs, has a 
positive effect on the search intensity for local jobs. Also here, the effect on the arrival rate for 
non-local job offers and that on the sum of the two arrival rates is not determined. The model is 
therefore consistent with Flateau et al.’s finding that homeowners with a mortgage have on 
average shorter unemployment spells, even though it does not predict this as a necessary 
outcome. 
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Higher moving costs increase the intensity of search for local jobs, and decrease that for 
non-local jobs. The effect on the sum of the two arrival rates is, again, not determined. 
A higher separation rate and a higher rate of discount decrease search intensity for local as 
well as non-local jobs. 
 
Housing tenure choice and its effect on labour market search 
An unemployed worker will own his home if the value of being an unemployed renter is 
less than that of being an unemployed owner:  
o
o
o
r VV <             (29)  
A choice for homeownership is a choice for the associated benefit h, which does not affect search 
behaviour, and for higher moving cost mc and different out-of-pocket housing cost.  
The first thing to observe is that the model does not unambiguously generate the 
predictions associated with the Oswald thesis, even though it explicitly incorporates moving cost. 
Even if the out-of-pocket cost of owner-occupied housing are lower than the rent, the higher 
moving cost has a positive effect on the search intensity of local job offers that may be strong 
enough to compensate for the negative effects of lower housing cost and lower intensity of search 
for non-local jobs. Unemployment rates of homeowners may therefore still be lower than those of 
renters. 
Second, if the out-of-pocket housing cost of owner-occupied housing are higher than that 
of renting, our model predicts that the arrival rate of job offers on the local labour market is 
higher for homeowners than for renters. The arrival rate of non-local job offers for homeowners 
may be lower as well as higher than that of renters. In this case there is no prediction of lower 
geographical mobility of homeowners. 
It can therefore be concluded that a relatively simple search theoretic model of labour 
market behaviour that explicitly takes into account the higher moving cost of unemployed 
homeowners does not generate the predictions of Oswald’s thesis and is consistent with much of 
the available empirical evidence. 
 
Discussion 
The model developed in the present section uses search theory to study the relationship between 
homeownership and unemployment. It takes the intensity of search as an endogenous variable, 
 21 
which is determined by the job searcher so as to maximize utility. In this model the higher cost of 
moving associated with homeownership has an increasing effect on the intensity of search outside 
the local labour market. However, the total effect on the arrival rate of job offers is not 
determined by the model. This implies that Oswald’s thesis, according to which homeownership 
has a negative influence on unemployment, is a possible outcome.  However, the same is true for 
the opposite effect, which was empirically observed by Munch et al. (2005). Both possibilities are 
consistent with optimizing behaviour of rational agents. In the context of our model Oswald’s 
thesis is not a proposition that necessarily follows from it, but it can be interpreted as a 
hypothesis concerning the sign of an effect that is not determined by the theory. The evidence 
suggests that it is empirically falsified. 
Moreover, the model also sheds light on the empirical results of Flatau et al. (2003) that 
highly leveraged homeowners have lower unemployment rates and shorter unemployment 
duration than outright owners and renters. It does so by considering cash-on-hand, that is the 
amount of money available for nondurable consumption, as an indicator of the homeowner’s well 
being. For highly leveraged homeowners mortgage payments are often larger than rents that have 
to be paid for comparable rental housing, implying that cash in hand is lower. In our model, this 
implies that the search intensity on the local labour market of such highly leveraged owners 
exceeds that of the renters. Even though the effect on search intensity outside the local labour 
market is indeterminate, the net result of the higher housing cost may well be that unemployment 
spells of such highly leverage homeowners are lower than those of renters, as observed by Flatau 
et al. (2003).  
The model can be extended so as to cover even more of the available empirical results. 
For instance, costs associated with losing the gains from rent control can be introduced into the 
model by including them as a component of the moving cost of renters. This would result in the 
prediction of more intense local labour market search by such renters as found by Svarer et al. 
(2006). 
Another extension would be to introduce housing market policy measures into the model. 
A means-dependent housing subsidy for renters would have similar effects as a higher 
unemployment benefit and may also result in higher moving cost for renters if the rental segment 
of the housing market is rent controlled.  Fiscal deductibility of mortgage interest payments has 
similar effects as a higher wage rate under progressive income taxation. A tax on housing sales, 
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as is currently in effect in the Netherlands, increases moving cost and therefore has a negative 
effect on geographical labour mobility. 
 
 
4. Empirical Evidence from the Netherlands 
 
Introduction 
In this section we report some preliminary results of empirical work that is inspired by the 
model developed in the previous section. We used the Housing Needs Survey (abbreviated in 
Dutch as WBO) of the year 2002. It provides information about the housing situation and a large 
number of related variables for about 75,000 Dutch households. 
 The WBO is a cross section and for this reason we focus on the probability of 
unemployment and its relationship with homeownership. The model developed in the previous 
section refers to the duration of unemployment spells as well as to unemployment rates of 
workers. The purpose of our estimations is to consider the relationship between homeownership 
and unemployment for the Netherlands. We noted in section 2 that empirical work has often 
rejected Oswald’s thesis, even though the theoretical model developed in section 3 does not 
predict the sign of the effect of homeownership on unemployment rates. Our empirical 
investigation addresses the question whether the empirical evidence for the Netherlands is in line 
with that found in earlier work, or is more favorable to Oswald’s thesis. 
 We concentrate attention on cases in the WBO where the respondent is one of the 
‘main inhabitants’ of the house, which means that the respondent is renter or owner-occupier or 
the partner of the renter or owner occupier. The questionnaire distinguishes between the 
respondent and his or her partner (if there is one in the household), but for our purposes it is more 
natural to make a distinction between males and females. For this reason we defined new 
variables that refer to the male and female main inhabitants.10 
 Our interest is in the relationship between unemployment and homeownership. We 
define the labor force as consisting of all the persons between 20 and 60 years old who are either 
working for at least 12 hours per week or receiving an unemployment benefit. Since the WBO 
                                                 
10
 It is possible that answers top questions referring to the respondent’s partner have more measurement errors than 
those referring to the respondent him- of herself, but we ignore this issue here. 
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contains the relevant information, we can compute unemployment rates for male and female main 
inhabitants per province and compare these figures with the unemployment figures provided by 
Statistics Netherlands. The correlation between the unemployment rates among main occupiers 
and the official figures is far from perfect: the correlation coefficient equals .53 for males and .56 
for females. Average unemployment rates among main inhabitants are lower than in the total 
labor force, as should be expected. 
 
Table 1 Provincial unemployment shares 
 Official figure Male main inhabitants Female main inhabitants 
Groningen 6.8 4.3 4.1 
Friesland 4.9 2.6 4.1 
Drenthe 5.3 2.8 3.2 
Overijssel 4.0 2.7 2.4 
Gelderland 5.0 1.4 2.9 
Utrecht 3.6 1.8 2.7 
Noord-Holland 4.1 1.4 2.3 
Zuid-Holland 3.9 2.3 2.8 
Zeeland 4.2 2.7 3.0 
Noord-Brabant 3.2. 3.0 3.3 
Limburg 3.4 2.6 3.0 
Flevoland 4.9 3.2 4.7 
Nederland    
Source: Statistics Netherlands for the official figures, own computations based on WBO 2002 for the other two 
columns. 
 
We use the WBO to compute the share of owner occupiers per province. There appears to 
be no relationship between unemployment and the share of owner-occupiers at this aggregate 
level. A simple regression of the unemployment rate on the share of owner-occupiers results in 
small and insignificant coefficients. 
 
 
Analysis at the micro level 
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We use linear regression on the variable that indicates that a member of the labor force (as 
defined above) is working. Even though our dependent variable only takes on the values 0 and 1, 
OLS is usually very informative in a first analysis. We start with using only one explanatory 
variable: a dummy indicating homeownership. The results, reported under (1) in Table 2, show 
that unemployment is higher among renter than among owner-occupiers, as is usually observed. 
Part of the difference disappears when we control for a number of personal and household 
characteristics as is shown in the second regressions. 
To deal with the possible endogeneity of the homeownership variable, we adopt an 
instrumental variables approach. We use the provincial share of homeowners, the average value 
of owner-occupied houses and the average rent as instruments. The regional share of 
homeowners has also been used by Koning and Van Leuvensteijn. We interpret the average value 
of houses as a (crude) indicator of the price of housing services provided by owner occupied 
housing and the average rent as a similar indicator for its main substitute: housing services 
provided by rental housing. Both prices should, according to economic theory be relevant to 
tenure choice.   
 
Table 2 Estimation results for probability of being employed 
 Males Females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
 0.95  0.96 0.96 0.88 0.95 0.90  0.89 0.82 
Owner-occupier 
 0.034  0.026 -0.015  0.035 0.024 -0.053  
Mortgage payment* 
   0.22    0.096 
Social rented 
housing 
  
 0.06    0.093 
Educ. Level  1  
 0.035 0.043 0.038  0.044  0.057 0.054 
Educ. Level 2  
 0.033 0.042 0.037  0.057  0.077 0.069 
Educ. Level 3  
 0.041 0.055 0.026  0.067  0.093 0.082 
Educ. Level 4  
 0.045 0.061 0.011  0.074  0.10 0.087 
Age x 100  -0.086 -0.059 -0.040  -0.056 -0.002 -0.0078 
Single  -0.030 -0.041 -0.0015  -0.016 -0.037 -0.019 
Single-parent  -0.028 -0.035 -0.0011  -0.0069 -0.030 -0.020 
Two earners   0.0017 0.051 -0.014  0.0072  0.022 0.0087 
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2R  0.010 0.021 0.007 - 0.009 0.020  - 
n  37,031 27,477 
* In thousand euros per month.  
Bold figures refer to significant coefficients. Significance (at 5% or better) has been determined on the basis of 
robust standard errors. 
 
Instrumenting the homeownership dummy leads to a reversal of sign in both regressions. 
The coefficient for homeownership in the regression for males is now insignificant, but in the 
regression for females it is significant, as would be expected on the basis of Oswald’s hypothesis. 
To investigate the effect of a mortgage and of social rented housing we introduced dummies 
indicating these two variables, but instrumental variable regression did not produce meaningful 
results. The probable reason is that in the Netherlands the majority of rental housing is social 
housing and most of the owner-occupied houses have a mortgage. These variables are thus highly 
correlated. In order to circumvent these problems we introduced (monthly) mortgage payment 
and a dummy for renting in the social sector into the regression equation, while removing the 
dummy for owner-occupation from it. Results of instrumental variables regression are given in 
columns (4). They show that owner-occupiers with a mortgage have a higher probability of being 
employed than the group owners without a mortgage and renters outside the social rented sector. 
Workers in social rented housing also have a higher probability of bring employed. These results 
can be interpreted as confirming Oswald’s hypothesis for outright owners, but not for owners 
with a mortgage. 
 
Conclusion 
Even though the results discussed above are clearly preliminary, they are in line with the findings 
in the literature reviewed in section 2. They leave open the possibility that Oswald’s thesis is 
valid for outright owners, as has been done in other empirical work, notably that of Flatau et al. 
(2003). We plan to investigate this issue more closely in additional empirical work using discrete 
choice models.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 26 
In the previous sections we have interpreted the literature generated by Oswald’s thesis. 
The challenging hypothesis that an increase in homeownership has the potential to increase 
unemployment by a substantial amount receives its plausibility from the negative effect of 
moving cost on labour market mobility. This aspect of the thesis is generally confirmed in the 
empirical work. The surprising issue is that, despite the fact that homeownership does hamper 
geographical mobility substantially, it does not seem to have negative effect on the length of 
unemployment spells. To the contrary, the studies of Flateau et al. (2003) and Munch et al. 
(2005) suggest that the net effect of homeownership on unemployment duration may be positive, 
at least for the important group of homeowners with a mortgage. 
To interpret these results, we developed a model for labour market search that 
incorporates the effects of homeownership by taking into account out-of-pocket housing expenses 
and moving costs. The model implies that homeowners are more reluctant to search for job offers 
outside their local labour market, which is the basic argument underlying Oswald’s thesis. 
However, it does not predict that homeowners have longer unemployment spells than renters, 
even though it does not exclude this possibility. The empirical violation of this basic ingredient of 
Oswald’s thesis can therefore be explained by a relatively simple search model that deals 
explicitly with two elementary housing issues, viz. moving cost and out-of-pocket housing costs. 
The model we developed is also consistent with empirical evidence that shows that highly 
leveraged homeowners have lower unemployment durations than renters and outsight owners and 
that homeowners are more likely to find a job on the local labour market than renters. 
The key to our results is that we have endogenized the arrival rates of local and national 
job offers by linking them to search costs that depend on cash-on-hand. The latter variable is 
defined as the difference between the unemployment benefit and out-of-pocket housing cost, that 
is, rent or mortgage payments. High mortgage payments therefore imply an incentive to search 
that is comparable to that of a low unemployment benefit. 
Like Munch et al. (2005) we distinguish between search on the local labour market and 
elsewhere. Unlike them, we do not assume a wage offer distribution and a reservation wage 
strategy, but concentrate on search intensity for jobs that offer a given wage. However, the results 
of their model with respect to exit rates from unemployment are similar to those derived here. 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the literature generated by Oswald’s hypothesis is 
that it strongly suggests, that the duration of unemployment is influenced substantially by 
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incentives that originate form the housing market. In particular, searchers seem to be able to react 
to decreased opportunities for geographical mobility by increasing their chances to find a job on 
the local labour market substantially, even to such an extent that the net effect on unemployment 
duration becomes positive. 
 
The previous observations and modelling experiments prompt the need for further 
theoretical and applied research. There is apparently a lack of a solid comprehensive framework 
that would have explanatory and predictive power for the unemployment-housing tenure 
interaction (including commuting). Next, there is also a need for micro-based individual panel 
data (preferably of a longitudinal nature) that would allow us to do a more rigorous testing also 
against other explanatory factors for unemployment (such as openness of the economy, 
immigration, trade union power, unemployment benefits and marginal tax rate systems). A 
careful specification analysis may also be able to cope with problems of reverse causality. In 
particular, it is important to trace the causes of law labour mobility over space (such as rental 
subsidies, high moving costs for tenants, institutional protection systems and the like. Especially 
the impacts of policy (housing, education, labour, transportation) deserve further attention and 
may lead to the need to specify a model with endogenous policy effects in terms of urbanisation, 
land use, commuting, labour market or fiscal effects. 
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Appendix Comparative statics of the search model 
In this appendix we consider the effect of small changes in the variables ]',,,,,[ ρσθ mcrbw=  on 
the optimal values of the arrival rates of job offers from the local labour market, olq , and from 
elsewhere, 0nq . These optimal values are the solutions to the first order conditions (24) and (25). 
However, it turns out to be more convenient to use instead the pair of equations (25) and (26), 
which are mathematically equivalent to (24) and (25).  We write: 
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Maximization of the value of unemployment V implies: 0);,();,( 21 == θθ onolonol qqfqqf . 
Taking the full derivative of (A1) in the optimum gives: 
i
i i
o
n
nl
o
l
l
dfdq
qq
adq
q
a θ
θ∑ ∂
∂
−=
∂∂
∂
+
∂
∂ 12
2
2
.       (A3) 
Similarly, taking the full derivative of (A2) in the optimum gives: 
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Solving equations (A3) and (A4) gives: 
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We can now derive the following results: 
- for w=1θ , 01 <∂
∂
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f
, 02 =
∂
∂
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, hence 0>
∂w
dql
, 0>
dw
dq on
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